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THE OFFER SHEET: AN ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT
NCAA PROHIBITION OF REPRESENTATIONAL
CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a volun-
tary organization of over 860 colleges and universities.' One of the pri-
mary goals of the NCAA is to "promote college sports, individually
and collectively." 2 Through its constitution and bylaws the NCAA es-
tablishes standards of eligibility with which its members must comply.
One such standard attempts to preserve the sanctity of amateurism3 in
intercollegiate sports. The student-athlete is prohibited from either re-
ceiving compensation for his athletic accomplishments or signing a
contract to play a professional sport in the future, regardless of its legal
enforceability;4 similarly, the student-athlete is precluded from con-
tracting or agreeing with an agent to be represented in the marketing of
his athletic ability.5 A violation of any one of these provisions will re-
sult in the immediate ineligibility of the student-athlete to compete in
I. NCAA, GENERAL INFORMATION PAMPHLET 3 (1978).
2. NCAA, PUBLIC RELATIONS MANUAL 93 (1976).
3. "A basic purpose of the Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body, and, by so doing retain a clear line of demarcation between college athletics and
professional sports." NCAA CONST. art. 2, § 2.
The NCAA Constitution defines an "amateur student-athlete" as "one who engages in
a particular sport for the educational, physical, mental and social benefits he derives there-
from and to whom participation in that sport is an avocation." NCAA CONST. art. 3, § I.
4. The NCAA Constitution provides:
Any individual who signs or has ever signed a contract or commitment of any kind
to play professional athletics in a sport regardless of its legal enforceability or the
consideration (if any) received; plays or has ever played on any professional ath-
letic team in a sport, or receives or has ever received, directly or indirectly, a salary,
reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a profes-
sional organization in a sport based on his athletic skill or participation, except as
permitted by the governing legislation of this association, no longer shall be eligi-
ble for intercollegiate athletics in that sport.
NCAA CONST. art. 3, § l(b).
5. NCAA CONsT. art. 3, § 1(c) provides in part: "Any individual who contracts or who
has ever contracted orally or in writing to be represented by an agent in the marketing of his
athletic ability or reputation in a sport no longer shall be eligible for intercollegiate athletics
in that sport."
NCAA, 1979-80 MANUAL OF THE NCAA (March 1979) [hereinafter cited as NCAA
MANUAL] contains a casebook of various fact situations which attempt to clarify the inter-
pretation of the NCAA Constitution and bylaws. Case No. 28 addresses the problem of
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that sport.6
In the past, professional sports agents have used various ploys to
evade the NCAA's rule that prohibits representational contracts be-
tween agents and student-athletes.7 One example of a recent effort to
circumvent this NCAA restriction is the "offer sheet."' The offer sheet
is essentially a revocable offer signed by the student-athlete and con-
veyed to the agent. According to the terms of the offer, it may not be
accepted by the agent until a date after the student-athlete's senior sea-
son of eligibility has been completed. On this date, barring a prior rev-
ocation by the student-athlete, the agent may accept the offer, thus
giving rise to aprimafacie representational contract.
Legally, there is no contract until the agent accepts the student-
athlete's offer, after the student-athlete's eligibility has expired. Prior to
that time, the student-athlete has made no binding commitment. He is
free to revoke his offer.' The NCAA contends that the signing of the
offer sheet by the student-athlete is, in itself, violative of its constitution
and will result in the premature loss of the student-athlete's eligibil-
ity.1
0
professional negotiations between the agent and student-athlete. Case No. 28 sets forth the
following:
Situation: A student-athlete desires to enter into an agreement with an agent for
representation in future professional negotiations in a sport which are to take place
after the young man has completed his eligibility in that sport. This agreement
may take either a verbal or written form.
Question: May the student-athlete agree to be represented by an agent without
jeopardizing his eligibility for the intercollegiate sport when the negotiations are to
take place after he has completed his eligibility?
Answer: No. A student-athlete who agrees or has ever agreed to be represented by
an agent or organization in the marketing of his athletic ability or athletic reputa-
tion no longer shall be eligible for the intercollegiate sport.
Id. at 188.
6. NCAA CONST. art. 3, § 1(b). See note 4, supra.
7. David Berst, the NCAA's Director of Enforcement, stated:
Agents use all kinds of gimmicks to try to get around our rules. An agent some-
times will write out a check to an athlete with a notation on the back, stating that
when the athlete endorses the check he is agreeing to be represented by the drawer
of the check.
Johnson & Reid, Some Offers They Couldn't Refuse, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 21, 1979, at
28 [hereinafter cited as Johnson & Reid].
8. The offer sheet was devised by sports agent Mike Trope. Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 35(l)(c) (1973) provides: "(1) An of-
feree's power of acceptance may be terminated by. . .(c) revocation by the offeror. .. "
See S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 55 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter
cited as WILLISTON]; I A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 38 (1950 & Supp. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as CORBIN].
10. The NCAA's Director of Enforcement, David Berst stated:
By signing a so-called offer sheet an athlete would in effect be agreeing to be repre-
sented at some time in the future by the agent. That would clearly be a violation of
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Representational contracts between professional sports agents and
student-athletes that are formed in violation of NCAA rules pose nu-
merous legal problems. This comment addresses those problems by ex-
amining the most recent method utilized by agents in their attempt to
circumvent NCAA regulations-the offer sheet.
Is the offer sheet violative of NCAA rules? Can its usage be con-
stitutionally prohibited by the NCAA? If so, is a contract that is
formed by means of an offer sheet or any other contract formed in vio-
lation of NCAA rules enforceable against a breaching party? This
comment examines the roles played by the student-athlete, the profes-
sional sports agent and the NCAA in the formation of representational
contracts. It assesses the utility of the offer sheet as a means of evading
NCAA regulations and analyzes the legal enforceability of contracts
formed in violation of NCAA rules. It further addresses the possibility
that contracts made in violation of NCAA rules may be illegal, and
investigates the potential liability to which an agent may be exposed by
contracting with a student-athlete in violation of the NCAA's regula-
tions.
II. THE CHARACTERS
A. The Agent
The agent is a prominent figure in the life of an athlete. He plays
an integral role in determining the economic value of the athlete's tal-
ents, and he has the ultimate responsibility of ensuring that the athlete
is properly compensated.' While agents may limit their services to ne-
gotiations with professional sports teams, some serve as the athlete's
personal manager, seeking opportunities for lucrative product endorse-
ments and public appearances. Many also act as advisors in the ath-
our regulations. Even an oral agreement to be represented by an agent is sufficient
to constitute a violation.
Johnson & Reid, supra note 7, at 30.
The NCAA amends its constitution and bylaws at its annual conventions. During the
interim, the NCAA Council, which is composed of 18 members who are elected at the an-
nual convention, is empowered by NCAA CONST. art. 5, § 1 to establish and direct the
NCAA's policies. According to NCAA CONsT. art. 6, § 2, the NCAA Council as well as the
officers of the NCAA may make binding interpretations of the constitution and bylaws.
Although the offer sheets seem to fit comfortably in an NCAA constitutional loophole,
Mr. Berst's unequivocal condemnation of the offer sheet as violative of the NCAA's Consti-
tution leaves little doubt as to the association's position. Because Mr. Berst is an officer of
the NCAA, his interpretation will probably influence most of the NCAA's member institu-
tions.
11. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 319 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
WEISTART & LOWELL].
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lete's business and tax planning activities. In short, agents frequently
have an immense impact on the lifelong financial security of the ath-
lete.
12
The recent explosion in the salaries of professional athletes 13 has
prompted many enterprising individuals to enter into the arena of pro-
fessional sports agency. Visions of rubbing elbows with superstars and,
more importantly, receiving percentages of their lucrative contracts are
enticing to most sports enthusiasts. With the proliferation of sports
agents, competition among them to represent the relatively few athletes
whose talents are in demand by professional sports franchises has in-
creased significantly. The agent who complies with NCAA rules and
refrains from entering into a representational contract with a student-
athlete until his eligibility has naturally expired will often find that the
most coveted athletes have already contracted for the services of an
agent. 14 For purposes of survival in the trade, it has become common
practice to disregard NCAA rules by secretly contracting with student-
athletes before their eligibility is up. t5 It is not uncommon for the stu-
dent-athlete to sign a representational contract with one agent, only to
be confronted by another who will perform the same services for a
lesser percentage.' 6 Induced by the latter agent's contention that the
athlete's contract with the initial agent is not legally enforceable be-
cause it was made in violation of NCAA rules, the student-athlete will
frequently renege on his original contract and accept the more profita-
ble offer of the latter agent. Because the initial contract violated
NCAA rules, an agent in this predicament may be hesitant to enforce
it. The publicity accompanying such a lawsuit could render the agent
inherently suspect in the eyes of the NCAA, its member institutions
and future student-athletes.' 7 The agent's reluctance to enforce the
12. Id.
13. The fuse was ignited during the 1960's when teams from competing leagues, such as
the National and American Football Leagues and the National and American Basketball
Associations, commenced a bidding war in efforts to secure the services of star athletes.
14. It has been maintained that 60% of the players drafted in the first three rounds ofthe
1979 National Football League draft had made a commitment to an agent of some form
before their college eligibility had expired. Johnson & Reid, Supra note 7, at 35.
15. Id. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1978, at D15, col. 3. Agent Richard Sorkin admit-
ted to the New York State Senate Select Committee that he had signed many student-ath-
letes to contracts of representation while they still had college eligibility. Sorkin also
testified that such practices were widespread among agents. Id.
16. Johnson & Reid, supra note 7, at 30.
17. In the long run, it might not be economically profitable for an agent who repeatedly
contracts with student-athletes in violation of NCAA rules to attempt to enforce such a
breach. The publicity accompanying such a law suit would alert the NCAA that the agent
had violated its rules and would undoubtedly prompt its enforcement division to probe the
Vol. 14
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breached contract may also arise from apprehension that a court will
look unfavorably on a contract made in violation of NCAA regula-
tions." The agent, therefore, is frequently compelled to accept such
piracy as a trade hazard.
While the offer sheet is merely a revocable offer and does not se-
cure a commitment from the student-athlete that he will be represented
by the agent, it does vest the power of acceptance with the agent. In so
doing, if the athlete does not wish to be represented by the agent, he
must take affirmative action to notify the agent of his revocation of the
offer.' 9 The offer is subject to interference by other agents prior to its
acceptance and may be revoked by the student-athlete. Once the offer
sheet is accepted by the agent, however, (assuming it does not violate
NCAA rules) it is an enforceable contract.20 The primary attribute of
the offer sheet is that it secures a non-contractual relationship with the
student-athlete prior to the expiration of his senior year of eligibility.
Barring revocation by the athlete, the mere signing of the offer sheet by
the agent on the date specified, along with the agent's notification of
acceptance, enables this relationship to mature into a contract solely
through the efforts of the agent. However, if the athlete reneges after
the agent's acceptance, a court of law would be more inclined to en-
force a contract which did not violate NCAA provisions. 2'
The enforceability of the offer sheet has recently been tested in
court. Fourteen breach of contract suits were initiated by one sports
agent against his former athlete-clients, alleging that each had secured
representation by other agents in breach of the offer sheet that each
athlete had executed.22 To date, all but one of the suits have been set-
tled.23 It appears, therefore, that the offer sheet approach to the forma-
tion of representational contracts between student-athletes and agents
will not be judicially scrutinized in the near future.
agent's future dealings with student-athletes. This ultimately could discourage future stu-
dent-athletes from dealing with the agent.
18. In at least one case, New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Foot-
ball Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1961), the court invoked the "clean hands"
doctrine and refused to enforce a contract between a student-athlete and a professional
sports franchise because it was secretly formed prior to the lapse of the student's eligibility,
and therefore, in violation of NCAA rules.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41 (1973) provides: "An offeree's power
of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an
intention not to enter into the proposed contract." See also id. § 35.
20. If use of an offer sheet is a violation of NCAA rules, the offer sheet's utility is nulli-
fied in that it is regarded as an outright contract that is blatantly violative of NCAA rules.
21. See note 18 supra.
22. Johnson & Reid, supra note 7, at 29.
23. M.L. Trope Co. v. Brown, No. C 282481 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed May 1, 1979).
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B. The NCAA
The NCAA's Committee on Infractions is responsible for the ad-
ministration of the NCAA's enforcement program.2 4 It investigates al-
leged violations and has the authority to either impose penalties on the
member educational institution, or recommend to the NCAA Council
that the institution's membership be either suspended or terminated. 2-
The student-athlete is not declared ineligible directly by the NCAA,
but rather by the member institution that he is attending.26 By mandat-
ing the institution to apply eligibility rules to student-athletes, the
NCAA indirectly accomplishes its objective. The failure of an institu-
tion to comply with NCAA policy invites a broad spectrum of sanc-
tions ranging from reprimand and censure to the termination of the
institution's membership in the NCAA17
The NCAA's power to impose sanctions on its member institu-
tions, which in turn discipline the student-athlete, has been consistently
upheld by the courts. The courts have held that the right to compete in
intercollegiate athletics is not protected by either the fifth or fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. In Colorado Seminary
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,28 the court found that the
NCAA's imposition of sanctions on Denver University, accompanied
by the deprivation of several athletes' eligibility due to their violation
of the NCAA's regulations against professionalism, were proper func-
tions of the association. The court stated that "student athletes have no
constitutionally protected property or liberty interests in participation
in intercollegiate athletics, post-season competition, or appearances on
television."'29
24. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 141.
25. Id. § 1(a)(3)-(4).
26. NCAA CONST. art. 4, § 2(a) provides: "Section 2. Conditions and Obligations of
Membership. The members of this association agree: (a) To administer their athletic pro-
grams in accordance with the constitution, the bylaws and other legislation of the Associa-
tion. See Official Interpretation in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 25.
27. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 145-46. See also Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v.
NCAA, 422 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976) (mem.), rev'd 560 F.2d. 352 (8th Cir. 1977)
(University of Minnesota's refusal to comply with the NCAA's determination that three of
its student-athletes be declared ineligible prompted the NCAA to declare the institution's
entire intercollegiate athletic program ineligible for competition in NCAA Championship
events and appearances on television for an indefinite period).
28. 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976) (mem.), a1f'd per curlam, 570 F.2d 520 (10th Cir.
1978).
29. Id. at 896. But see Behagan v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representa-
tives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972) (mem.). In Behagen, the court regarded the student-
athlete's eligibility as a property right which was subject to due process. The court stated:
[Tihe opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletics is of substantial eco-
Vol. 14
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However, the actions of the NCAA in supervising and policing
intercollegiate athletics are subject to constitutional scrutiny.30 The de-
gree of scrutiny to which such an action is subject varies, however, de-
pending on its discriminatory effects." NCAA policies and actions
which tend to arbitrarily discriminate on the basis of alienage or
against some clearly defined group are subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny.32 The NCAA must "bear the heavy burden of demonstrating that
the (policy) is justified by a compelling interest. 33
If the NCAA policy does not appear to discriminate against a
clearly defined class of people, it is subject to the "minimum rational-
ity" standard of scrutiny.34 Thus, it will be upheld if it merely bears
some rational relationship to a legitimate purpose of the NCAA
3 1
When a court determines that an NCAA objective is legitimate
and the means of promoting that objective do not deprive the institu-
nomic value to many students. In these days when juniors in college are able to
suspend their formal educational training in exchange for multi-million dollar con-
tracts to turn professional,. . . the chance to display their athletic prowess in col-
lege stadiums and arenas throughout the country is worth more in economic terms
than the chance to get a college education.
Id. at 604.
30. In Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Mass. 1973), the court stated, "the
NCAA in supervising and policing the majority of intercollegiate athletics and athletes na-
tionwide performs a public function, sovereign in nature, that subjects it to constitutional
scrutiny."
31. In Howard Univ. V. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court declared
unconstitutional the NCAA's "foreign student" rule which stated: "Participation as an indi-
vidual or as a representative of any team whatever in a foreign country by an alien student-
athlete in each twelve-month period after his nineteenth birthday and prior to his matricula-
tion at a member institution shall count as one year of varsity competition." Id. at 215 n. 1.
The court reasoned that "the rule clearly establishes an alienage classification, treating for-
eign student-athletes differently than American student-athletes, and thus must be subjected
to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 222.
At the same time, the court scrutinized the NCAA's "1.600 rule." The 1.600 rule re-
quired that freshman athletic eligibility be limited to those student-athletes whose high
school academic performance indicated their ability to maintain a 1.600 grade point average
while in college. Id. at 216 n.3. The court upheld the rule as being reasonably related to
proper objectives of the NCAA. Apparently the rule did not discriminate against any
clearly defined group and thus was subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny. The rule merely
needed to be rationally related to a legitimate objective of the NCAA. Id. at 221.
32. Id. at 222.
33. Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (D. Mass. 1973) (NCAA provision irra-
tionally discriminated against Canadian hockey players who resided in the United States
and desired to compete in intercollegiate hockey).
34. Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (W.D. La. 1973), a17'd, 506 F.2d 1028,
1034 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming the district court's ruling that the NCAA's 1.600 rule was
rationally related to the NCAA's goal of insuring that the student-athlete be an integral part
of his institution's student body and educational program).
35. Id.
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tion or the student-athlete of their constitutional rights, the disciplinary
action taken by the NCAA will be upheld.
3 6
C. The Student-Athlete
The student-athlete and his relationship with the institution that
he attends have been the subject of various controversies. The court's
characterization of this relationship is essential to a thorough analysis
of the viability of the offer sheet as a means of forming a legally bind-
ing contract.
The status of the student-athlete, who frequently derives financial
support from the institution,37 varies depending upon the context in
which the relationship is being considered. The courts have deter-
mined the nature of the student-athlete's relationship with the institu-
tion in three types of situations: scholarship cases, income tax cases,
and workman's compensation cases.38
A pertinent issue that arises out of such litigation is whether the
relationship between the student-athlete and the institution is contrac-
tual or purely academic. The academic interpretation centers on the
scholarship money received by the athlete and his participation in in-
tercollegiate sports as facets of the overall educational process. 39 Inter-
collegiate athletics are perceived to be one of many extracurricular
activities offered by the educational institution, while the scholarship
provided for the athlete is viewed as financial assistance intended to
defray educational costs.40 The scholarship awarded to the student-
athlete on the basis of his future participation in a sport is analogous to
financial aid provided to a student in recognition of his or her academic
record or theatrical talents.4' Such scholarships may be contingent on
that student maintaining a minimum grade point average or perform-
ing in certain theatrical productions.42
The NCAA apparently concurs in this interpretation. Its constitu-
tion states:
36. Compare Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220 (W.D. La. 1973) with Buckton v.
NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (1972), in which the NCAA's efforts to keep professionalism out
of intercollegiate sports were deemed unconstitutional because they were held "to irration-
ally discriminate against Canadian players who were resident aliens." 366 F. Supp. at 1160.
See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
37. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 4 sets forth the principles governing financial aid.
38. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 11, at 8.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 8-9.
42. Id.
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Section 2. Fundamental Policy. (2) The competitive athletic
programs of colleges are designed to be a vital part of the edu-
cational system.
A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain inter-
collegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational pro-
gram and the athlete as an integral part of the student body
43
While the educational aspect of intercollegiate athletic participa-
tion has been acknowledged by the courts,44 the judiciary has tended to
ignore the traditional educational approach espoused by the NCAA
and its member institutions, and has found contractual relationships
between student-'athletes and their schools on numerous occasions.
For example, in Taylor v. Wake Forest,45 a student-athlete and his
father sued Wake Forest University for the wrongful termination of his
athletic scholarship. The court regarded the application for a football
grant-in-aid, in which the student-athlete had agreed to maintain eligi-
bility pursuant to NCAA rules, as a contract with the university. It
denied any relief however, because the student-athlete, by refusing to
participate in the football program, had not complied with his contrac-
tual obligations.46 His failure to perform relieved the university of its
obligation to maintain his scholarship. 47
The finding of a contract between the athlete and the university
infers that the athlete's participation in intercollegiate sports is consid-
eration for his scholarship, which is in turn regarded as compensation
for his athletic services. The failure to participate results in the cancel-
lation of the compensation. The court's failure in Taylor to character-
ize the scholarship as academic contradicts the NCAA's fundamental
view of collegiate sports as an integral component of the educational
process.
The court in Colorado Seminary,4" similarly refers to the athlete-
43. NCAA CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
44. See, e.g., the court's discussion of the NCAA's emphasis on the educational aspects
of sport in Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 889 (D. Colo. 1976) (mem.), qfl'd
,per curiam, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978).
45. 16 N.C. App. 117, 191 S.E.2d 379 (1972).
46. Id. at 121, 191 S.E.2d at 382.
47. NCAA CONsT. art. III, § 4(c)(2) provides in pertinent part: "(2) Aid may be gra-
dated or cancelled if the recipient. . . (i) renders himself ineligible for intercollegiate com-
petition; or. . . (iv) voluntarily withdraws from a sport for his own personal reasons. ...
Under (iv) above, such gradation or cancellation of aid may not occur prior to the conclu-
sion of that term (semester or quarter)."
48. 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976) (mem.), aft'dper curiam, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir.
1978).
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institution relationship as contractual. In assessing the property rights
of student-athletes who were declared ineligible by the NCAA, it
stated:
the contracted for property interest is not just the scholarship
funds received in exchange for the athlete's services. The con-
tractual interest includes the expectation that the student will
be allowed to participate in intercollegiate competition, the
only contingency being that he be good enough to make the
team and that he avoid injury. Thus, the services offered is
what is also sought-the playing of collegiate sports. The "lib-
erty interest" in a forum. . . becomes a property interest pro-
vided by contract in a forum. And the claimed property
interest in intercollegiate athletics has the added dimension of
a contract to play intercollegiate athletics.49
It is apparent that the courts are not adverse to characterizing the
athlete-institution relationship as contractual.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has also been confronted with
the task of determining the nature of financial assistance from the insti-
tution to the athlete. The Internal Revenue Code generally provides
that the recipient of a scholarship is not taxed on the income derived
therefrom.50 In Revenue Ruling 77-263," the IRS ruled that an ath-
letic scholarship was non-taxable income if it could not be cancelled in
the year of its award due to the athlete's non-participation. The
NCAA, however, permits its member institutions to cancel or gradate
financial aid if a student withdraws from participation in a sport.
5 2
Most universities award athletic scholarships on a year to year basis. If
a scholarship athlete decides after a year to withdraw from athletics,
renewal of his financial aid will undoubtedly be denied for the remain-
der of his college career. It can be inferred that the student-athlete's
participation in intercollegiate sports is, in reality, consideration for the
scholarship. This approach adds credence to the view that the athlete-
institution relationship is contractual in nature.
Worker's compensation claims on behalf of student-athletes have
likewise mandated the court's analysis of the athlete-institution rela-
tionship.53 The ultimate issues are whether the scholarship athlete may
49. Id. at 895 n.5.
50. I.R.C. § 117(A).
51. 1977-2 C.B. 47.
52. NCAA CoNsT. art. III, § 4(c)(2). See note 47 supra for the text of this provision.
53. See Cross, The College Athlete and the Institution, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 151,
165 (1973). Cross states:
It should be apparent, however, that the typical relationship between a student-
[Vol. 14
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be regarded as an employee of the college or university, thereby giving
rise to a contractual relationship.
The worker's compensation cases indicate that the courts will find
an employer-employee relationship only if it appears that the scholar-
ship or outside employment obtained by the student is compensation
for his participation in an intercollegiate sport. 4 Barring any extrinsic
employment with the university or special circumstances surrounding
his scholarship, the student-athlete will not be regarded as an employee
of the institution. 5 Whether the scholarship provided to the student-
athlete is regarded as compensation seems to depend on the circum-
stances of each case. Absent any indications that the athletic scholar-
athlete and his institution is not one of employment. Even if the funds used to
supply athletic financial aid are generated by the program through gate receipts or
contributions, the basic academic relationhship is not necessarily changed. Finan-
cial aid in some other academic programs shares the basic characteristics of aid to
student-athlete.
54. In Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 451, 33 Cal. Rptr.
169 (1963) (per curiam), a student athlete received $50 per quarter scholarship and rent
money during the football season. Subsequent to his death in a plane crash on the return
flight from a road game, his widow sought death benefits under the California worker's
compensation laws. The California Court of Appeals annulled the Industrial Accident
Commission's decision that the student-athlete was not an employee under the Worker's
Compensation Act, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-5911 (1971). The court, however, stated:
It cannot be said as a matter of law that every student who received an "athletic
scholarship" and plays on the school athletic team is an employee of the school.
To so hold would be to thrust upon every student who so participates as an em-
ployee status to which he has never consented. . . . Only where the evidence es-
tablishes a contract of employment is such an inference reasonably to be drawn.
219 Cal. App. 2d at 467, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
In University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953) (en banc), a
student-athlete was employed in the maintenance of tennis courts. This employment was
found to be contingent on his participation in football. As a result of sustaining an injury in
football practice, he sought worker's compensation benefits. Because his employment was
dependent on his playing football, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the award of the
Industrial Commission, concluding that the injuries sustained by the student-athlete in foot-
ball practice arose out of his employment. The benefits received by the athlete were viewed
as compensation for his football abilities.
Four years later, however, in State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 135
Colo. 570, 314 P.2d 288 (1957) (en banc), a student-athlete was fatally injured in a football
game. The student-athlete had been on a football scholarship and was a part time employee
of the school. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the
trial court, which affirmed an award of death benefits to the athlete's widow by the Indus-
trial Commission of Colorado. The court stated: "Since the evidence does not disclose any
contractual obligations to play football, then the employer-employee relationship does not
exist and there is no contract. . . . A review of the evidence disclosed that none of the
benefits he received could, in any way, be claimed as consideration to play football .... "
135 Colo. at 572, 314 P.2d at 289-90. The court based its decision on the finding that the
benefits conferred on the student-athlete were not given in consideration for participation in
athletics as in Nemeth. Id.
55. Id.
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ship is consideration for the student's participation in an intercollegiate
sport, the courts will most likely deny the existence of an employment
relationship and its contractual consequences.
5 6
Under the present interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code
provisions, athletic scholarships appear to be taxable.57 The IRS, how-
ever, has apparently not enforced this interpretation and has refrained
from taxing athletic scholarships.
The above analysis may suggest that public policy plays an inte-
gral role in both the IRS and judiciary characterizations of the relation-
ship between the student-athlete and his institution. The hesitance of
the IRS to tax in this area is probably attributable to the potentially
negative effect that it might have on intercollegiate athletics. Because
most scholarship student-athletes receive room and board and payment
of educational expenses, taxation on the value of these benefits would
be extremely burdensome for many student-athletes. 58 The need for
money to pay taxes would encourage professional influences in college
athletics. Classification of scholarships as taxable compensation would
also obscure the fine line between amateurism and professionalism.
The court's aversion to characterizing all athletic scholarships as em-
ployment relationships similarly seems to stem from the adverse effect
that it might have on intercollegiate sports by forcing the educational
institutions to bear the responsibility and costs of providing unemploy-
ment compensation for injured student-athletes. This burden would be
likely to impede the development of intercollegiate sports, which have
experienced tremendous growth in the past 25 years.59
III. THE OFFER SHEET
The primary area of concern in assessing the offer sheet and other
56. Id.
57. According to Rev. Rul. 77-263, an athletic scholarship is nontaxable income if it
cannot be cancelled in the year of its award due to the athlete's non-participation. 1977-2
C.B. 47. The NCAA Constitution allows the institution to cancel or gradate a scholarship at
the end of the quarter or semester due to non-participation. NCAA CONsT. art. III,
§ 4(c)(2). Because a student-athlete's scholarship may be cancelled or gradated at the end of
the quarter or semester, it can be argued that the money received by him should be taxed by
the IRS.
58. A student-athlete attending a private university in which the tuition is much higher
than a state supported university would have to pay higher taxes although he is not actually
receiving more income.
59. For example, since 1953 the total college football attendance figures have increased
every year, except for one. Attendance has exceeded 31 million every year since 1973.
NCAA, GENERAL INFORMATION PAMPHLET 13 (1978). In 1979, over 35 million people at-
tended college football games. L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 1980, § 3 (Sports), at 4, col. 1.
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efforts by agents to evade NCAA regulations is whether there is a viola-
tion of the NCAA's constitution and bylaws, which can result in the
termination of a student-athlete's eligibility. Although the NCAA has
unequivocally stated that the offer sheet is violative of its constitution,60
a court will not enforce a declaration of ineligibility unless the it is
rationally related to a legitimate objective of the association.6'
The objective that the NCAA purports to promote in this instance
is amateurism. Its rules prohibit the student-athlete from even entering
into an "agreement" to be represented by an agent. 2 It can reasonably
be argued that in signing the offer sheet, the student-athlete has legally
agreed to nothing and therefore, has made no legal commitments. The
signing of an offer sheet can be regarded as merely preliminary negoti-
ations to a contract that will be made subsequent to the athlete's final
season of eligibility.6 3 Thus, the signing of an offer sheet would not
constitute an agreement or be an infraction of the NCAA's rules.
Conversely, the NCAA could maintain that the offer itself is suffi-
cient "agreement," even though it is not legally binding. Because the
agent in most cases initiates the dealings with the student-athlete, the
signing of the agent's offer sheet is evidence of the student-athlete's as-
sent to a future representational contract. The offer signifies an agree-
ment to be represented, even though the agreement can be revoked. As
stated by Williston, an offer "is an expression by the offeror of his
agreement that something over which he at least assumes to have con-
trol shall be done or happen or shall not be done or happen until the
conditions stated in the offer are complied with."'" Such analysis indi-
cates that the offer sheet could be considered an agreement between the
student-athlete and agent, violating the NCAA's rule barring agree-
ments with agents.
For an NCAA rule to be upheld by a court, it must be rationally
related to a legitimate goal of the association.65 It is debatable whether
a rule that prohibits the student-athlete from signing an offer sheet that
has no legally binding effect until after the athlete's intercollegiate ca-
60. See note 10 supra.
61. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 5 supra. Williston states: "An agreement as the courts have said 'is nothing
more than a manifestation of mutual assent' by two or more legally competent to one an-
other." WILLISTON, supra note 9, § 2.
63. No enforceable contractual relationship has been secured between the agent and
athlete. The offer extended by the student-athlete is merely a part of the preliminary negoti-
ations to the contract.
64. WILLISTON, supra note 9, § 24A.
65. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
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reer is over, if at all, is rationally related to the preservation of amateur-
ism in intercollegiate athletics. It is essential to analyze the rationale
behind the NCAA's rule prohibiting agreements between student-ath-,
letes and agents in an attempt to preserve amateurism.
Amateur sports focus on the educational physical, mental and so-
cial benefits that the athlete derives from them.66 Theoretically, the
athlete is motivated not by monetary benefits, but by his love of the
sport. To preserve the purity of amateur competition, the NCAA seeks
to exclude any influences which challenge the ideals of amateurism.67
Such influences include professional sports agents and teams. Pay-
ments by agents to student-athletes in contemplation of securing serv-
ices in the future is repugnant to amateurism. 68 While it would be an
injustice to accuse all agents of such improprieties, it is no secret that
non-repayable loans and under-the-table payments to athletes are per-
vasive in the athlete-agent relationship.69 To discourage transactions of
this nature, the NCAA has enacted rules barring "agreements" between
the student-athlete and the agent. A student-athlete who violates these
rules is declared ineligible and is no longer allowed to compete in inter-
collegiate sports.
The student-athlete's right to make preparations for his future
financial security by making a non-binding offer is impaired by the
threat of ineligibility. The student-athlete's right to make such a non-
binding offer must be balanced with the NCAA's right to promote am-
ateurism. This obvious conflict is not easily amenable to resolution.
Although the NCAA expressed itself adversely to the use of offer
sheets,7" it did not impose any sanctions upon the colleges and universi-
ties whose student-athletes allegedly were parties to offer sheets.7 I Fu-
ture infractions, however, are likely to be pursued by the NCAA. Its
uncompromising stance acts as fair warning to future student-athletes
who contemplate entering offer sheet agreements.
The courts have previously upheld NCAA regulations barring the
student-athlete from contracting to play a professional sport on the ba-
sis that the regulation, which would ultimately deprive the student-
athlete of his eligibility, was rationally related to the legitimate NCAA
66. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1.
67. See generally NCAA CONST. art. III.
68. See NCAA CONST. art. III, § l(a).
69. Johnson & Reid, supra note 7, at 57.
70. See note 10 supra.
71. Players who allegedly signed the offer sheets include: Ottis Anderson, University of
Miami, Steve Atkins, University of Maryland, and Theotis Brown and Jerry Robinson, Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles.
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objective of preserving amateurism. Although the parties to an offer
sheet do not contend that they have formed an enforceable contract
until after the athlete's senior season of eligibility, the Ninth Circuit has
upheld the deprivation of a student athlete's eligibility in an analogous
situation. In Shelton v. NCAA,72 Shelton, a student-athlete, was de-
clared ineligible to play college basketball at Oregon State University
because he had signed a purportedly unenforceable contract73 to play
for a professional basketball team. Shelton contended that the NCAA
rule which rendered him ineligible regardless of the unenforceability of
the contract created "an impermissible classification in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause."74 Shelton also maintained that it was "un-
reasonable to treat as a professional one who alleges that the contract
which he signed is unenforceable."" The court acknowledged the oc-
casional hardships caused by the NCAA's rule prohibiting both en-
forceable and unenforceable contracts to play professionally. It upheld
the NCAA regulation, however, stating, "[r]eliance on a signed contract
as an indication that a student's amateur status has been compromised
is rationally related to the goal of preserving amateurism in intercolle-
giate athletics. 76 The court further stated:
The NCAA and its member institutions cannot simply take an
athlete's word that the signed contract is void. An eligibility
rule limited to contracts that would withstand a court test
would be no rule at all. One could sign a contract, then allege
that it was unenforceable and participate at will in college
athletics while maintaining an option to enter the professional
ranks at any time. Clearly, this would obliterate any remain-
ing distinctions between amateur and professional athletes.
77
In Shelton, the Ninth Circuit clearly indicated that a student-ath-
lete who has signed a contract to play a professional sport regardless of
its legal enforceability, can constitutionally be declared ineligible for
further competition in that sport by the NCAA. Although an offer
sheet is not purported to create a contract at the time it is signed by the
72. 539 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976).
73. Shelton contended that the contract he had signed with an American Basketball As-
sociation team was unenforceable because he had been induced to sign it by means of fraud
and undue influence. Id. at 1198. The legal enforceability of the contract was the subject of
another suit brought by Shelton against the professional team, which was pending at the
same time as his action against the NCAA.
74. 539 F.2d at 1198.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1199.
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student-athlete, it is probable that the courts would similarly condone
an NCAA rule prohibiting the signing of an offer sheet. A conclusion
upholding such a regulation could reasonably be reached by looking
through the form of the offer sheet to its substance. It is essentially a
means of side-stepping the NCAA's objective of preserving amateurism
in intercollegiate sports, an objective which has been deemed legitimate
by the courts.78 While a contractual obligation is not created by a stu-
dent-athlete's signature on an offer sheet, the relationship secured by
the offer sheet between the student-athlete and the agent may fre-
quently be accompanied by those aspects of professionalism, such as
under-the-table loans, payments, and other extra benefits that the
NCAA has endeavored to prevent. In this respect, the offer sheet may
be equated with an actual contract to be represented by an agent.
Thus, although the signing of an offer sheet may be innocuous in itself,
the NCAA is justifiably apprehensive of the professional influences in-
herent in such a relationship. Because the NCAA's prohibiting the for-
mation of representational contracts by means of the offer sheets
appears to be rationally related to the NCAA's objective of excluding
professionalism in intercollegiate sports, it will most likely be upheld
by the courts.79
IV. Is A CONTRACT FORMED IN VIOLATION OF NCAA RULES
ENFORCEABLE?
Assuming that the use of the offer sheet or any similar device is
upheld by the courts as violative of NCAA rules, the question arises
whether a contract formed by such means is valid and enforceable in
the event of a breach by one of the parties.
As previously stated, student-athletes are frequently induced to
breach a contract with one agent by another whose terms are more
favorable.A0 The rights of the agent who initially contracted with the
student-athlete in violation of NCAA rules are uncertain. Cases deal-
ing with breaches of professional sports contracts that are violative of
NCAA rules exclusively involve student-athletes and professional
78. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
79. In Shelton, the Ninth Circuit stated: "It is not judicial business to tell a voluntary
athletic association how best to formulate or enforce its rules." 539 F.2d at 1198. Thus, it
appears that if an NCAA rule even remotely promotes a legitimate goal of the association, it
will not be closely scrutinized by the courts. It may further be argued by the NCAA that the
regulation barring the signing of an offer sheet does not prohibit the student athlete from
entering into such an agreement, but merely precludes him from participating in NCAA
sports after he has done so.
80. Johnson & Reid, supra note 7, at 30.
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sports teams.81 An important analogy, however, can be drawn from
such cases, providing the student-athlete with a viable defense to a
breach of contract action initiated by an agent. Primarily, the student-
athlete may utilize the unclean hands doctrine82 as a defense.
A. The Unclean Hands Defense
The adage that "he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands" has been utilized as a defense in actions against student-athletes
who have reneged on contracts made with professional teams.13 The
unclean hands defense may similarly be used by a student-athlete in an
action against him for breach of a contract formed by means of an offer
sheet. The unclean hands defense closes the doors of the court to a
party to a contract which is "tainted with inequitableness or bad faith
relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may
have been the behavior of the defendant.""4 It may, therefore, preclude
recovery by an agent who has secretly contracted with a student-athlete
in violation of NCAA rules because of the bad faith and possible ille-
gality of such a contract.
81. The competition for top rate players between the old AFL and NFL in the 1960's
prompted many teams to contract with promising college players before their senior seasons
of eligibility had ended. If a team selected a player in the first round of the draft, it wanted
to ensure that the player would not sign with a team in the rival league. Induced by substan-
tial amounts of money, numerous college players signed contracts to play professional foot-
ball prior to the draft and the end of their senior seasons. See Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely,
361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1966) (contract between pro football team
and a student-athlete made in violation of NCAA rules held enforceable); New York Foot-
ball Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961)
(undisclosed contract between pro football team and a student-athlete held unenforceable
on the basis of the clean hands doctrine); Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson, 186 F. Supp.
933 (E.D. La.) aI'd, 283 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1960) (the signing of contractual forms by a
student-athlete to play for a pro football team merely constituted an offer because of the
team's failure to satisfy a condition precedent of obtaining the NFL Commissioner's ap-
proval); Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1960)
(same).
82. "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. A court will neither aid in
the commission of a fraud by enforcing a contract nor relieve one of two parties to a fraud
from its consequences where both are inparidelicto." 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFOR-
NIA LAW 5233 (8th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as WITKIN].
83. California courts have long acknowledged that the unclean hands defense is avail-
able in actions at law as well as those in equity. In Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky, 210 Cal.
428, 437, 292 P. 474, 478 (1930), the court stated: "It is well settled that under the system of
code pleading equitable defenses and equitable counterclaims may be set up in actions at
law, as well as legal defenses and counterclaims in suits in equity." Accord, Goldstein v.
Lees, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. East
Bay Union, 227 Cal. App. 2d 675, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964).
84. WITKIN, supra note 82, at 5233.
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An example of the usage of the unclean hands defense as a result
of the bad faith inherent to a contract made in violation of NCAA rules
is found in New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers
Football Club, Inc. 85 In that case, Wellington Mara, the owner of the
New York Football Giants persuaded Charles Flowers, a senior at the
University of Mississippi, to sign a contract to play professional foot-
ball prior to the expiration of his collegiate eligibility. 6 The contract
was violative of NCAA rules because it was made prior to the Sugar
Bowl, where Flowers was scheduled to play his final game for the Uni-
versity of Mississippi. Mara and flowers agreed, however, to refrain
from disclosing the signing until after the Sugar Bowl so that Flowers
could not be declared ineligible.87
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment denying
Mara's request for specific performance by invoking the clean hands
doctrine. The court focused on the deceptive intent of both Mara and
Flowers in their conspiracy to conceal the existence of the contract.
We think no party has the right to create problems by its devi-
ous and deceitful conduct and then approach a court of equity
with a plea that the pretended status which it has foisted on
the public be ignored and its rights be declared as if it had
acted in good faith throughout.88
Thus, even though the court did not regard Mara's conduct as ille-
gal, the clean hands doctrine was nevertheless applicable because it is
based on equitable, not legal principles.8 9 The inequitable conduct was
not in the signing of the contract to play professional football, but
rather in the attempt to conceal the student-athlete's ineligibility,
thereby deceiving the NCAA, the institution, and the public into be-
85. 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961).
86. Flowers also received a $3,500 bonus at the time of signing the contract. Id. at 473.
87. To ensure confidentiality, Mara agreed not to submit the contract to the NFL Com-
missioner for approval until after the Sugar Bowl. When Flowers unsuccessfully attempted
to withdraw from the contract by telephone, Mara immediately filed the contract with the
Commissioner who approved it. Flowers subsequently wrote a letter to Mara, returning the
bonus money and informing him of his withdrawal from the contract. Id.
88. Id. at 474-75.
89. In describing the application of the clean hands doctrine, the United States Supreme
Court has stated:
Accordingly, one's misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature as
to be punishable as a crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character. Any
willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress
equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the
maxim ....
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co. 324 U.S. 806, 815
(1945).
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lieving that the student-athlete was still an amateur.9" The Fifth Cir-
cuit refused to consider the legal merits of the case and premised its
decision exclusively on the parties inequitable intent to defraud inter-
ested third parties.9 1
However, the Tenth Circuit in Houston Oilers v. Neely9 2 regarded
the secrecy of a contract which violated NCAA rules as an inadequate
reason for the denial of equitable relief. The facts in Neely resembled
those in New York Football Giants, Inc.93 Ralph Neely, a student-ath-
lete from the University of Oklahoma contracted with the Houston Oil-
ers thus rendering himself ineligible to play in the post-season Gator
Bowl game. To enable Neely to participate in the Gator Bowl, it was
agreed in an extrinsic oral understanding that the existence of the con-
tract would not be disclosed until after the game.94 After apprising the
Oklahoma coach of his contract with Houston, however, Neely was de-
clared ineligible and did not play in the Gator Bowl.
The trial court denied injunctive relief on the basis of the clean
hands doctrine. In reversing the trial court, the Tenth Circuit regarded
the secretive nature and the deceitful intent of the parties to be of mini-
mal significance.95 The court stated:
[The above-mentioned conduct. . . does not furnish athletes
with a legal excuse to avoid their contracts for reasons other
than the temptations of more attractive offer. Although there
are many dismal indications to the contrary, athletes, amateur
or professional, and those connected with athletics, are bound
by their contracts to the same extent as anyone else, and
90. 291 F.2d at 474.
91. The court states: "Without considering the legal issues on the merits, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court. We do so by application of the age-old, but sometimes over-
looked, doctrine that 'he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.'" Id. at 473.
92. 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1966).
93. 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961).
94. Prior to the Gator Bowl, however, Neely entered negotiations with the Dallas Cow-
boys. He returned the bonus checks that had been conveyed to him upon his signing the
Houston contract and advised the Oilers that he did not consider himself bound by his
previously signed contract. 361 F.2d at 39.
95. The Tenth Circuit stated:
It is neither unlawful nor inequitable for college football players to surrender their
amateur status and turn professional at any time. Neely was free to bind himself to
such a contract on December 1, 1964 (prior to the expiration of his eligibility) as he
would have been after January 2, 1965 (after the expiration of his eligibility). Nor
was Houston under any legal duty to publicize the contract or to keep it secret. Its
agreement to keep secret that which it has a legal right to keep secret cannot be
considered inequitable or unconscionable as those terms are ordinarily used in
contract negotiations.
Id. at 42.
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should not be allowed to repudiate them at their pleasure. 96
There are only two apparent disimilarities between New York
Football Giants, Inc. and Neey. First, Neely's ineligibility was ex-
posed prior to the Gator Bowl and he didn't play in the game whereas,
Flowers played in the Sugar Bowl despite his ineligibility.97 Second,
Neely was accompanied by a third party during the negotiation of the
contract. Neither dissimilarity, however, appears to be of any signifi-
cance in the court's reasoning. 98 It is suggested, therefore, that the dif-
ference in the outcomes of Neely and New York Football Giants, Inc. is
based primarily on the Tenth Circuit's apparent requirement of a
higher degree of culpability on behalf of the plaintiff before it will ap-
ply the clean hands doctrine.
As previously stated, the clean hands doctrine is based on equita-
ble principles. Illegality is not a prerequisite for its application. Thus,
the Neely court's interpretation of the clean hands doctrine appears to
be overly stringent. The surreptitious formation of the contract was
expressly intended to deceive the public as to Neely's amateur status.
Had Neely played in the Gator Bowl and had his ineligibility been
subsequently disclosed, the NCAA could have ordered the University
of Oklahoma to forfeit both its gate receipts and the game. The threat
of such severe sanctions to the University and its fans seems to justify
the application of the clean hands doctrine to contracts made in this
manner. A team whidh has worked diligently all season long can be
stripped of a championship title if one of its members had been a party
to an undisclosed contract which violated NCAA rules.99 The uniform
96. Id. at 41.
97. In reference to the New York Football Giants case, however, the Tenth Circuit in
Neely asserted:
It is quite apparent that the player contract in [New York Football Giants] was
acquired under circumstances much different from those in this case, but if the rule
announced in that case was intended to apply to every instance in which a contract
is entered into with a college football player before a post season game with an
understanding that it be kept secret to permit the player to compete in the game,
then we must respectfully disagree with the conclusion.
Id. at 42.
98. See notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit based its decision
on the premise that the contract was not formed in an inequitable manner.
99. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 5, at 148.
Section 10. If a student-athlete who is ineligible under the terms of the constitu-
tion, bylaws or other legislation of the association is permitted to participate in
intercollegiate competition contrary to such NCAA legislation. . . . the Council
may take any one or more of the following actions against such institutions in the
interest of restitution and fairness to competing institutions:
(b) Requirement that team victories achieved during participation by such ineligi-
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denial of either speific performance or damages by the courts would
seem to serve as an adequate deterrent to the formation of such con-
tracts. The Tenth Circuit's refusal to uniformly deny specific perform-
ance or damages'00 can only encourage those who wish to contract with
a student-athlete in violation of NCAA rules.10
B. Illegality of the Contract as a Defense
Although the courts have assessed only the equitable implications
of such an agreement, if the relationship between the student-athlete
and the institution is deemed contractual by the court as in Taylor,10 2 a
student-athlete who is a party to a contract made by means of an offer
sheet or any other similar device that violates NCAA rules may have
another defense in a breach of contract action. It can be argued that a
contract formed in violation of NCAA rules is also illegal. The Restate-
ment of Contracts provides that, "a bargain, the making or perform-
ance of which involves a breach of contract with a third person is
illegal."°3 If the formation of a representational contract between the
student-athlete and the agent was upheld as violative of NCAA rules
and resulted in the ineligibility of the student-athlete, he would be pre-
cluded from complying with his contractual obligations to the univer-
sity. According to Taylor, the student-athlete's contractual obligations
include maintaining his athletic eligibility, both physically and scholas-
tically." a Because the formation of a representational contract by
means of an offer sheet will probably render the student-athlete physi-
cally ineligible,"0 5 thereby preventing him from performing on his con-
tract with the school, such a contract could conceivably be held
unenforceable due to its illicit nature.
The Restatement of Contracts, further provides: "A bargain the
ble student-athlete shall be abrogated and the games or events forfeited to oppos-
ing institutions;...
(d) Determination of ineligibility for one or more National Collegiate Champion-
ships in the sports and in the seasons in which such ineligible student-athlete par-
ticipated ...
Id.
100. See note 95 supra.
101. In Contractual Rights and Duties of the Professional.4thlete-Playing the Game in a
Bidding War, 77 DICK L. REv. 352, 378 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Contractual Rights], the
author suggests that the refusal of all courts to enforce such secretive contracts on the basis
of the clean hands doctrine would eliminate the problems caused by contracting with college
athletes prior to the expiration of their eligibility.
102. See note 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
103. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 576 (1932).
104. 16 N.C. App. at 121, 191 S.E.2d at 382.
105. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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performance of which would tend to harm third persons by deceiving
them as to material facts, or by defrauding them, or without justifica-
tion by other means is illegal."' °6 It cannot be disputed that the surrep-
titious formation of a contract in violation of NCAA rules "would tend
to harm third persons by deceiving them as to material facts."' 10 7 Ac-
cordingly, if a secretly formed representational contract was held to be
violative of NCAA rules, the contract could possibly be deemed illegal
on this basis.
If a student-athlete competes in intercollegiate sports and is later
found to have been a party to an offer sheet or any similar instrument
that violates NCAA rules, he can be declared retroactively ineligible.
Thus, the unpublicized signing of any such instrument in violation of
NCAA rules that results in the athlete's ineligibility could have severe
ramifications for both the student-athlete's team and school. 0
C Possible Tort Liabiliy of the Agent
At the same time, an agent who has induced a student-athlete into
breaching his contractual relationship with the instutition may have
committed a tort. As previously indicated, the repercussions of a stu-
dent-athlete participating in an intercollegiage sport despite his ineligi-
bility may be disastrous to the university at which the athlete is a
student. Taken to an extreme, a university could be compelled to for-
feit the enormous gate receipts from a prestigious bowl game as well as
its National Championship status. An agent who induces a student-
athlete to enter into a contract which violates NCAA rules and, thereaf-
ter, participates in its concealment, could conceivably be liable in tort
to the university that the student-athlete attends. Should a court deter-
mine that the athlete-institution relationship is contractual,0 9 an agent
might be liable for interference with contractual relations.1 0 Should a
court find no contract, the agent might still be liable for interference
106. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 577 (1932).
107. Id.
108. For example, in 1971, Villanova and Western Kentucky Universities were forced by
the NCAA to return all gate receipts from the NCAA Championship Basketball Tourna-
ment because student-athletes on their teams had secretly signed contracts to play profes-
sional basketball. The teams were also deprived of the victories in which the ineligible
players had participated. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1972, at 50, col. 6. See also NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 5, at 148.
109. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
110. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 929 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER] states: "One type of interference with economic relations has been marked out
rather definitely by the courts, and regarded as a separate tort, under the name of inducing
breach of contract, or interference with contract."
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with an advantageous relationship."'
The fact that a scholarship contract between a student-athlete and
an institution is terminable at will may be insignificant for the purpose
of an action in tort for the inducement of its breach) 2 In Buckaloo v.
Johnson, 3 the California Supreme Court stated:
The tort of interference with an advantageous relationship, or
with a contract, does not, however, disintegrate because it re-
lates to a contract not written or an advantageous relationsho
not articulated into a contract. The nature of the tort does not
vary with the legal strength or enforceability of the relation
disputed. The actionable wrong lies in the inducement to
break the contract or sever the relationship, not in the kind of
contract or relationship so disrupted, whether it is written or
oral, enforceable or not enforceable.' 14
Whether or not a contract exists, it cannot be disputed that there is
an advantageous relationship between a star athlete and his university.
An agent's disruption of such a relationship, which results in the loss of
championship status or gate receipts, could render him liable in tort to
the student-athlete's institution. A prerequisite to a cause of action for
interference is that the agent actually induce the breach. Prosser states
that "[alcceptance of an offered bargain is not in itself inducement of
the breach of a prior inconsistent contract. ... , While an agent
could utilize the offer sheet as evidence that he merely accepted the
student-athlete's offer and did not induce the breach, the fact that the
offer sheet was provided by the agent would mitigate this argument.
Because the agent generally initates and pursues negotiations with the
student-athlete, denial of inducement would rarely be a viable defense
to a cause of action for interference.
The possibility of a cause of action on behalf of a university
against a professional sports agent for interference with either a con-
tractual or advantageous relationship exists, especi lly where an agent
11. Prosser further states: "The subsequent development of the law has extended the
principle to interference with advantageous economic relations even where they have not
been cemented by contract .. " Id. § 129, at 931.
112. "[T]he overwhelming majority of cases have held that interference with employ-
ments or other contracts terminable at will is actionable, since until it is terminated the
contract is a subsisting relation of value to the plaintiff, and presumably to continue in ef-
fect." Id. § 129, at 932-33.
113. 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975) (en banc).
114. Id. at 822, 537 P.2d at 868, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
115. PROSSER, supra note 110, § 129, at 934.
19801
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
conspires with the student-athlete to conceal the student-athlete's ineli-
gibility. The potential liability of an agent in this respect is enormous.
CONCLUSION
The NCAA's interpretation that the offer sheet violates its rules
due to the threat it poses to amateurism will most likely be upheld by
the courts because the prohibition is rationally related to furthering the
NCAA's legitimate objective of preserving amateurism in intercollegi-
ate athletics. Thus, the utility of the offer sheet as the most recent
means used to circumvent NCAA restrictions has been severely im-
paired.
The minimum rationality standard of scrutiny to which NCAA
rules are subject would similarly serve to preclude any other schemes
devised by agents to contract with a student-athlete before his eligibil-
ity has expired.
The signing of an offer sheet or any other agreement that violates
NCAA rules by the student-athlete results in his ineligibility to com-
pete in intercollegiate sports. If the student-athlete immediately ceases
to participate in the collegiate sport and his relationship with the insti-
tution that he is attending is not regarded as contractual, an offer sheet
or any other agreement with a student-athlete that violates NCAA rules
will probably be held enforceable against the breaching party. If, how-
ever, the signing of the instrument that violates NCAA rules is not dis-
closed and the student athlete continues to participate in the
intercollegiate sport, thus deceiving the NCAA, the university and the
public as to his eligibility, the resulting contract will most probably be
held unenforceable on the basis of the clean hands doctrine. Similarly,
if a contract is determined to exist between the student-athlete and his
institution, a subsequent representational agreement which forces the
student-athlete to renege on his commitment to the institution could be
found to be unenforceable on the grounds of its illegality, regardless of
whether it is publicized or concealed. At the same time, the agent in
such a contract could be exposed to tort liability for his improper inter-
ference with the college or university's contract or advantageous rela-
tionship with the student-athlete.
The future of the offer sheet and any other means of forming a
representational contract with the student-athlete prior to the expira-
tion of his eligibility appear bleak. The beneficial aspects of such
schemes are outweighed by their inherent deficiencies. The likelihood
that the signing of such agreements will be upheld by the courts as
being violative of the NCAA Constitution and bylaws render them ter-
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minally defective. Therefore, agents in the future may either comply
with NCAA rules and sign a student-athlete to a representational con-
tract after his eligibility has expired, or may contract with the student-
athlete in violation of NCAA rules. The dilemma of the agent is obvi-
ous. The latter course of action threatens him with numerous poten-
tially adverse legal repercussions and the former threatens him with
starvation.
Joseph Michael Manisco
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
LAW REVIEW
UNBOUND BACK VOLUME PRICES
Price Per
Volume Issues Issue Volume
5 1-3 $ 3.00 $ 8.00
6 1-3 3.00 8.00
7 1-3 3.00 9.00
8 1-3 3.50 10.00
9 1-4 4.00 13.00
10 1-4 4.00 14.00
11 1-4 4.00 14.00
12 1-4 4.00 14.00
13 1-4 4.50 15.00
_ Please send volume - and/or issue -.
I wish to Subscribe to the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
Price $15.00.
Please enclose remittance with your order payable to Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review and mail it to:
BUSINESS EDITOR
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
LAW REVIEW
1440 W. Ninth Street
Los Angeles, Ca. 90015
NAME
ADDRESS
CITY STATE ZIP
